Media Governance and Industries Lab Blog

By Anthony Löwstedt (Webster Vienna Private University)

*This blog post is part of the Jean Monnet Chair of European Media Governance and Integration series

From the perspective of communication ethics, there are reasons to reject online hate speech against women on the grounds of all three major sorts of ethics: virtue ethics, duty ethics and utilitarian (consequentialist) ethics. A misogynous person has a vicious and unbalanced character and does not flourish or live up to his own potential; and he wants to prevent women from living up to theirs. Immanuel Kant would say he violates the categorical imperative in general. (Or how would the misogynist like it if he was hated because of his gender?) Kant would also say that the misogynist fails to enhance the freedom of rational beings by directing hate at women. Moreover, he would fail to treat women as ends in themselves; he would miserably lack respect and civility. The utilitarian, finally, would reject the misogynist because he wishes to harm and cause pain to women (Plaisance 2014, pp. 24-35). Although the tradition of duty ethics seems most opposed to hate speech against women, all main currents of ethics oppose it and none of them try to excuse it at face value.

Already 4,000 years ago, Ptahhotep, the ancient Egyptian sage, wrote: ‘Guard against reviling speech, which embroils one great with another.’ (Lichtheim, 1973, § 8). This appears to be a criminalizing approach, much like current regulatory hate speech policies. Today, still, counter-speech is sometimes not enough to silence hate speech, and that is when the guards may be called upon (European Court of Human Rights, 2017; Sponholz, 2016). Especially if it has immediate violent effects, the prosecution of hate speech can lead to criminal convictions (Trager et al., 2014: 108-111). Ptahhotep’s use of the present rather than the future tense of ‘embroil’ seems to anticipate this development.

We should apparently only guard against speech that sets ‘great’ (or ‘elder’ (Wilkinson, 2016, p.  260)) people against each other. Here Ptahhotep seems to refer to adults or leaders who can rally supporters against each other. Responsibility is a function of power. In case of hate speech and incitement: we would not need to throw children or other less powerful people in jail for saying sexist or other reviling things, but Ptahhotep would say that we still need to confront and do something about it. Men are more powerful than women, Ptahhotep implies at another juncture (Lichtheim, 1973, § 1). Therefore, it seems, sexism against women should be punished more harshly than sexism against men.

With such consensus on misogynism, it seems fairly straightforward that it should be punished harshly, especially if violence results from it immediately. And even if children may be let off the hook for hate speech, they should still be disciplined in some way, too. But only if powerful people spread hate with followers who commit hate crimes soon after the hate speech by the powerful has taken place, should we apply criminal law. And if the hate speech amounts to incitement to violence on a large scale, such a genocide, or gendercide, then we should consider applying the harshest punishment that the law allows. Julius Streicher, a chief Nazi propagandist, was found guilty at the Nuremberg war tribunal of incitement to genocide and sentenced to death and executed, although he never (directly) killed anyone himself. There may be alleviating circumstances that get you off death row for murder, but there is no excuse, apparently, for hate speech amounting to incitement to genocide or other crimes against humanity.

But how about freedom of speech, and freedom of expression? Could hate speech be tolerated and excused after all? In the long-term interests of free flow of information, confidence-building, and trust in the information systems, we may have to allow hate speech (and perhaps also other abominations, such as defamation and invasion of privacy). Perhaps we must even accept that some violent hate crimes deplorably but inevitably result, especially if they happen a while after the hate speech took place. It is then the price we must pay for living in a democracy.

Freedom of expression also appears as something positive in Ptahhotep (Lichtheim, 1973, §§ 4, 17).

However, freedom of expression is not an absolute right with a veto against other rights. We should be particularly wary of those who practice hate speech, then invoke their right to freedom of expression, and then pretend or act as if they are guardians of the freedom of expression. We should always scrutinize the interest a claim of free speech is aimed at promoting (Plaisance, 2014, p. 162).

Uneasy compromises between the position of punishing hate speech, especially when it originates directly from powerful groups or persons, and, on the other hand, the position of freedom of speech as a basic good and a prerequisite for democracy and other human rights, continue to characterize the media and communication landscapes. Even after 4,000 years, we do not seem to be any closer to a solution.

• Council of Europe (n.d.). Combating sexist hate speech. Gender Equality Strategy, Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/1680651592 (accessed 20 April, 2018)
• European Court of Human Rights (2017, March). Factsheet: Hate speech. Council of Europe Press Unit, Conseil de l’Europe Unité de la Presse. Retrieved from http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf (accessed 20 April 2018).
• Lichtheim, M. (1973). Ancient Egyptian literature. Volume 1: The Old and Middle Kingdoms. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Plaisance, P. L. (2014). Media ethics: Key principles for responsible practice (2nd ed.). London: SAGE.
• Sponholz, L. (2016). Islamophobic hate speech: What is the point of counter-speech? The case of Oriana Fallaci and ‘The Rage and the Pride’. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 36(4): 502-522.
• Trager, R., Russomanno, J., Dente Ross, S. & Reynolds, A. (2014). The law of journalism and mass communication (4th ed.). Los Angeles: Sage.
• Wilkinson, T. (2016). Writings from ancient Egypt. Penguin Classics. London: Penguin Random House.